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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The Abstention Doctrine: A Problem of Federalism
Equitable abstention refers to the deference a federal court will give
a state tribunal to determine the rights of the litigants, even though
technically, a federal court could entertain the action, whether by
means of diversity of citizenship or because of a federal issue involved.
Because of comity, or convenience, or a sense of balance in the fed-
eral system, or better handling of the problem, or some other reason
of policy, federal courts at times have required a litigant to proceed
in the state courts before invoking federal court jurisdiction. How this
doctrine arose, its extensions and limitations form the subject of this
note.
I. HISTORY
The term itself, equitable abstention, carries with it the seeds of
its history, for the traditional discretion of the chancellor in equity
proceedings is said to be its source.1 In practice, however, the doctrine
appears responsive to the practical problems of avoiding unnecessary
state-federal conflict.
In 1908 the Supreme Court held in Ex Parte Young 2 that the
eleventh amendment did not prohibit suit against a state official if
he were acting in violation of the Constitution. Five years later the
Court held that acts of state officials, though contrary to state law,
may come within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment.'
Thus, enforcement of a state statute may be state action for purposes
of the fourteenth, but only individual action for purposes of the
eleventh amendment. Despite this illogic, the Supreme Court ex-
panded federal jurisdiction and increased the possibility of federal
interference with state governments. This imbalance was poted by
Congress, which took the following steps to correct the situation:
in 1910 a requirement of a three judge court in certain injunction
proceedings;4 in 1913 a stay of federal injunction proceedings upon
the institution of state court enforcement proceedings accompanied
by a suspension of the statute or order;5 the Johnson Act of 1934
which deprived federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin state
utility rate orders;6 and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937 limiting the
jurisdiction of federal courts to enjoin the collection of state taxes.
1. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
2. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
3. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). The habeas corpus statute also requires exhaustion of
state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEREnAL
COURTS Am THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 854-55 (1953).
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Meanwhile the federal judiciary itself was firmly at work, developing
a doctrine of judicial restraint based on considerations of comity and
a regard for the proper balance in the federal system. Nevertheless,
abstention from jurisdiction specifically conferred has created its own
problems, both because of diverse views on its constitutionality and
because of the practical questions of its desirability in terms of
expense, confusion, and delay.
II. FEDERAL JUDICIAL REsTBAINT-EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
A. Administrative
Distinct from the doctrine of equitable abstention but nevertheless
important in understanding its development and policies is the re-
quirement that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before
invoking the court's jurisdiction.8 The reasons are obvious. First, the
plaintiff may not need to seek a judicial determination, for he may
prevail in the proceedings before the agency.9 Second, the administra-
tive agency is regarded as a kind of expert in the certain field to
which it pertains. 0 Being more intensely involved with the particular
area, it is more likely to be able to determine the facts. Third, ex-
haustion may be demanded simply because of comity." If a state
has gone to the trouble of providing a special agency to handle
particular cases, the policy thus attempted to be established might
be thwarted by premature judicial proceedings.
The rule has its limitations however. Where the statute establish-
ing an agency or commission is invalid on its face, 12 or where the
agency is bound by the decision of a higher agency 13 or by a state
court decision, 14 where the existence of an administrative remedy is
doubtful, 15 or the remedy inadequate,16 exhaustion will not be re-
8. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). See generally
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 2 RAc. REL. L. REP. 561 (1957).
9. "The very purpose of providing . . . administrative determination . . . is to
make unnecessary later judicial proceedings." Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsh,
331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947). Further, if the complainant does not succeed in the
administrative proceedings, he may resort to the court "without fear of being met by
a plea of res judicata." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra note 8, at 230.
10. Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 768.
11. "And as applied to Federal interference with state acts, the observance of this
rule of comity should be regarded as an obligation." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line,
supra note 8, at 237. See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937).
But see McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), note 76 infra and accom-
panying text.
12. Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
13. Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
14. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499 (1928).
15. Union Pacific R.R. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 247 U.S. 282 (f918).
16. Kelly v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
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quired. There is, however, a presumption that the administrative
body will act legally.'7
B. Judicial
If the remedy which the plaintiff seeks is judicial and could be
entertained by either state or federal court, the plaintiff is generally
able to proceed directly in the federal court without first seeking
relief in the state court system, unless there is a federal statute 8
which provides for exhaustion of judicial remedies. In other words,
there is no requirement for exhaustion of judicial remedies. 19 But for
the doctrine of equitable abstention, this statement could be made
unqualifiedly. The abstention doctrine herein discussed presupposes
that the requirements for federal jurisdiction are met in every way,
i.e., that the statutory jurisdictional requirements are met, that there
are no special statutory mandates against assuming jurisdiction and
that administrative remedies, if there are any, have been exhausted.
III. ABSTENTION GENERALLY
A few years after the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins20 imposed a
new regard for state law upon the federal courts, the Supreme Court
fashioned a rule dealing with uncertain state law and thus created the
abstention doctrine. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Co.,21 a suit to enjoin orders of the commission as being violative of
the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause, the Court noted
the "sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal court ought
not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open."2 Since
the constitutional question might be circumvented by an adjudica-
tion of the commission's authority under state law, the state law
would have to be interpreted. It was at this point that the Court
departed from earlier practices2 3 Remanding the case to the district
court with directions to stay the proceedings until the Texas court
could determine the state law, the Court said, "no matter how
17. "Until there has been a failure of the administrative process, it should be
assumed in a federal court that state officials will obey the law when their official
action is properly invoked." Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 1962).
18. Notes 5-7 supra.
19. "Barring only exceptional circumstances, . . . or explicit statutory require-
ments ... resort to a federal court may be had without first exhausting the judicial
remedies of state courts." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Supra note 1.
22. 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
23. In deciding state law questions in a diversity suit, Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing
for the Court, added to the decree "that the parties . . . may apply at any time to
the court below ...for a further order or decree, in case it shall appear that the
statute has been then construed by the highest court of Florida as applicable to the
transactions in controversy here." Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 426 (1934).
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seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape
being a forecast rather than a determination."24
The Pullman technique has since been followed and alternately
approved and criticized.2 While the federal courts have abstained in
cases involving uncertain or unconstrued state law, in order to avoid
constitutional issues and unnecessary friction, the Court held in
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven26 that uncertain state law is by
itself no ground for abstention. In that case, the plaintiffs sought in
a federal district court an injunction prohibiting the city from re-
deeming certain bonds without paying deferred interest charges on
them. The only issue before the court concerned state law as no
federal question was raised. In reviewing an order dismissing the
case, the Supreme Court reversed and ordered the district court to
take jurisdiction, saying, "when such exceptional circumstances are
not present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely
because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or
uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the
state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act."27 There
are other limitations. Where a federal question would persist,28 or
where the action is essentially federal,29 the federal courts have exer-
24. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, supra note 1, at 499.
25. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); City of Meridian
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Shipman v. DuPre, 339
U.S. 321 (1950); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Spector Motor Serv. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168
(1942); Chicago, B & 0. R.R. v. City of North Kansas City, 276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir.
1960). For the latest criticism, see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). Professor Moore,
while pointing out that Pullman makes necessary two actions instead of the one, says,
"it is possible that this price is not too high if necessary to promote good federal-
state relations." la MooRE, FE RnAL PRAcTIcE 2114 (1961).
26. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). But see, Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S.
478 (1940), a case which involved a dispute between the trustee under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and claimants as to certain property rights under uncertain state law. The
Supreme Court held that the district court should have ordered the trustee to proceed
in a state court. The case seems to have had no influence beyond the area of bank-
ruptcy. See also, Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, 185 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1950); In re Central R.R. of N.J., 163 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
810 (1947).
27. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, supra note 26, at 235.
28. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 462-63 (1943).
29. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-93 (1949); All Am. Airways v. Cedarhurst,
201 F.2d 273, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1953). But see the Civil Rights cases discussed infra,
note 62. In Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945), appeal dismissed
sub nom., McElroy v. Mitchell, 316 U.S. 690 (1945), a three judge court asked to enjoin
a state statute on grounds of violations of the first through the fourteenth amendments,
noted that the Pullman doctrine evolved in cases determining "property rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment and not personal rights under the First . . . .We yet like
to believe that wherever Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal Constitu-
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cised jurisdiction. On the other hand, the avoidance of constitutional
questions is not exhaustive of the policy behind abstention, as there
are cases where the courts abstained without this motivation.
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,30 a suit to enjoin the execution of an
order of the Texas Railroad Commission, the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's dismissal, relying upon the special system of regu-
lation and procedure provided by Texas law. The Court cited a
history of confusion resulting from federal court interference. "Delay,
misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the
state policy, are the inevitable product of this double system of
review."3 ' In that case the emphasis was on avoidance of conflict,
not on avoidance of constitutional issues or clarification of state law,
although both these issues were before the Court. In Alabama Public
Service Comm'n v. Southern R.R.,3 a suit to enjoin a state administra-
tive order denying the railroad permission to discontinue service, the
Court stated first that the issue presented did "not involve construction
of a state statute... e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co."
nor "constitutionality of a state statute."3 The decision of the Court to
dismiss rested on grounds of comity-the proper regard for the inde-
pendence of state government. Thus while Burford may be read
as following Pullman, the Alabama decision clearly does not depend
on construction of state law or avoidance of constitutional issues, but
on avoidance of state-federal conflict. Professor Moore has criticized
the Alabama decision as a "judicial Johnson Act of doubtful wisdom
and propriety.
3 4
By 1951 the Court had evolved two "abstention doctrines," the
policy being to (1) avoid constitutional questions and to (2) avoid
unnecessary conflict with a state's administration of its affairs. One
day in 1959 the Supreme Court handed down four cases dealing with
the abstention doctrine.35 These cases merit reading, not only because
of the legal issues involved, but because of the various opinions ex-
pressed by the judges. Two of the cases involving eminent domain
proceedings contain such conflicting language, it is not difficult to
see what confusion besets district judges when confronted with the
abstention issue. In Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co.,36 the
tion are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we have not the right to
decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be
adjudicated in some other forum." 60 F. Supp. at 54-55.
30. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
31. Id. at 327.
32. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
33. Id. at 344.
34. la MOoRE, FEDm i. PRAc cE 2114 (1961).
35. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Harri-
son v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360
U.S. 185 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
36. Supra note 35.
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plaintiff landowners brought an action of ouster in the district court,
alleging that the county had taken their property under eminent
domain, for private use in violation of settled Pennsylvania law. The
district court dismissed on the ground that it would be interfering
with a state's administrative affairs. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that in such a case, the district court would only be acting
as another state court. There were no exceptional circumstances, no
federal questions, no danger of disrupting federal-state relationships.
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 7 an eminent
domain proceeding brought by the city in the state court and re-
moved to the district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship,
the district judge ordered abstention pending determination of the
uncertain state law. The Supreme Court bad previously held in
Meredith 8 that uncertain state law was, by itself, no ground for ab-
stention. The Allegheny opinion had stated that "eminent domain is
no more mystically involved with 'sovereign prerogative' than ... a
host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and
their subdivisions which have been brought into question ' 39 in the
federal courts without state court determination of state law. Yet
the majority of the Court in Thibodaux ordered abstention, declar-
ing that eminent domain is of a "special and peculiar nature .... [Ilt
is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative."40
The Court distinguished the Meredith case in a footnote,41 stating
that the issue there was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to
the state court; the court of appeals had dismissed. In Thibodaux
the court of appeals had denied the district judge his discretionary
power to stay disposition of a retained case until he could get a
controlling decision from the state court. The dissenters did not see
the distinction and pointed out in a footnote2 that the Court in
Meredith ordered the district court to adjudicate the issues, rather
than retain jurisdiction and abstain from deciding the state law
issues. They offered two grounds for the Court's decision: (1) the
difficulty of interpreting state law (the Court "should frankly an-
nounce that Meredith v. City of Winter Haven is overruled, for no
other conclusion is reasonable." )43 and (2) a distaste for diversity
jurisdiction.44
Professor Wright, however, has offered different reasons for the
37. Supra note 35.
38. Supra note 26.
39. 360 U.S. 185, 192 (1959).
40. 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
41. Id. at 27, n.2.
42. Id. at 38, n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id. at 41.
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case. "[T]he special nature of eminent domain proceedings, com-
bined with difficulties of state law, will permit abstention though
neither of the circumstances individually would."4 Second, he ac-
cepts Justice Frankfurter's footnote, that "the grant of a stay in an
eminent domain case is a matter of discretion for the trial court."46
This matter of discretion is an interesting one, Professor Wright points
out, for in the Burford type case, dismissal is appropriate, rather than
abstention with retention of jurisdiction-the procedure in the Pull-
man, or avoidance of constitutional questions, type abstention cases.
47
In both Allegheny and Thibodaux, the Court spoke of the trial judge's
discretion, something which the earlier abstention cases had not
mentioned. Later the Court in NAACP v. Bennett48 remanded a
Pullman type case to the district court in order that the judge, who
had automatically referred the case to the state court, would exercise
discretion in deciding whether to refer to the state court for construc-
tion of state law.
Though the Court did not "frankly overrule" Meredith-indeed it
distinguished the case and adhered to it as authority for the proposi-
tion that unclear state law by itself is no ground for abstention49-
the lower courts have since been in conflict over the question of
unclear state law. In a bankruptcy proceeding involving determina-
tion of the validity of a chattel mortgage under state law, the Sixth
Circuit has recently declared, citing Meredith, that the "mere diffi-
culty of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine
the state law to be is not in itself a sufficient ground" for abstaining
from the exercise of its jurisdiction.50 A few days earlier the Fifth
Circuit, in a 5-4 decision, had required abstention, quoting Thibodaux,
and awaited the interpretation of Texas contracts according to Texas
law by the Texas courts.51 The concurring opinion in that case was
bothered by the problem of equality within the circuit. "If 'we guess
it off' for Texas, what happens to equality of treatment within the six
States of this circuit when, for like questions, either initially or under
Supreme Court mandate, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court?"
52
45. Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 815, 821
(1960).
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 821-22.
48. 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
49. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673, n.5 (1963): "we hold that
difficulties and perplexities of state law are no reason for referral of the problem to
the state court."
50. In Re Mohammed, 327 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1964).
51. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).
52. Id. at 489 (Brown, J., concurring). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960), the Supreme Court utilized a device provided by a Florida statute, which
allowed the certification of questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court for
1252 [VoL. 17
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The dissenting opinion took the view that this was no exceptional case
and came within the Meredith rule, and further that "Texas, unlike
Florida, has made no provision for the certification by federal courts
of doubtful questions to its supreme court for resolution." 3 The con-
curring opinion's position on the question of equality seems untenable,
since it is the state of Texas which has deprived its litigants of the
certification procedure. Perhaps this conflict rM will be resolved by a
restatement of the Meredith rule by the Supreme Court and a clarifi-
cation of the Thibodaux case and the narrow ground of its holding.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REmEDIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Abstention
Though the abstention doctrine evolved from Pullman, a civil
rights case, it has been said to be misapplied in civil rights actions,
because of the evil at which they aim, i.e., deprivation of rights
federal in nature, and because of the "futility of seeking relief in
state courts."55 Professor Wechsler has observed that "application
of the federal authority to invalidate the action of a state is best
accomplished when the issue finds its way to the Supreme Court after
it has had examination in the state courts," the exceptions being
state remedies which are too "uncertain, slow, or ineffective." 6 In
the area of civil liberties, he makes a major qualification to this
statement, "within this precious area .. .there is to be no slightest
risk of nullification by state process." 5 7
The policies behind abstention, when it is used such that it becomes
a delaying tactic,58 an obstruction to a speedy determination of one's
determination upon request by a federal appellate court. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031
(1961). But the problem of equality within the circuit is not for the federal court;
it seems to be one for the other state legislatures. If they wish a certification device
such as that of Florida, they may enact it.
53. 328 F.2d at 485 (Tuttle, C.J., Hutcheson, Wisdom and Bell, JJ., dissenting).
54. See also, Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 128-29 (1st Cir.
1962) (District court improperly enjoined defendant from proceeding in state court
for declaratory judgment. If parties could not get a state court judgment by the time
the federal action went to trial, the abstention doctrine would be applied on ground
of unclear state law.); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cir.
1962) (certifying question of state law to state court); A.F.L. Motors v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56, 60 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
55. Note, 14 RuT. L. REv. 145, 187 (1959). See generally, Comment, 2 RAc. REL. L.
REP. 1228 (1958).
56. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &
Co~mrnMp. PROB. 216, 229 (1943).
57. Id. at 230.
58. "This is a delaying tactic that may involve years of time and that inevitably
doubles the cost of litigation. When used widespread, it dilutes the stature of the
Federal District Courts, making them secondary tribunals in the administration of
justice under the Federal Constitution." Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 35, at 180
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For a review of the problems of delay in desegrega-
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constitutional rights, have been thought to be outweighed by the
larger policy of providing a federal forum for determination of federal
rights.59 In a number of cases following Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,60 however, the federal courts abstained in order that the state
courts might interpret state statutes6' or refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion in the first instance because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
administrative remedies. 62 The Supreme Court cut back on the ab-
stention doctrine in some cases. In Turner v. City of Memphis, 63 the
district court had abstained, pending interpretation by the state
courts of state statutes relied upon by the defendants. The Court
held that there was no occasion for abstention since the unconstitu-
tionality of state statutes requiring segregation in publically operated
facilities had been foreclosed as a litigable issue. But where the state
statutes were unclear and a constitutional question might be averted,
a divided Court held otherwise. In Harrison v. NAACP,6 the
Court ordered abstention while the state courts interpreted five Vir-
ginia statutes allegedly unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment. It is to be remembered that abstention in such cases is
postponement of jurisdiction pending construction of state statutes;
the federal court usually retains jurisdiction pending the outcome of
the state court proceedings. If the constitutional question persists, the
federal court will still have jurisdiction of it. Nevertheless there
remains the problem of expense and delay. Harrison made another
tion, see Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification,
63 COLum. L. REv. 1163, 1183 (1963). The author submits proposals for federal
legislation, among which is the abolition of the abstention doctrine in civil rights cases.
"Whatever value the doctrine may have in other cases, it only provides an occasion
for disastrous delay in racial discrimination and racial protest cases."
59. Stapleton v. Mitchell, supra note 29.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 35; Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of
Prince Edward County, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 391
(1964); Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957). Bryan v. Austin, 148
F. Supp. 563 (E.D.S.C. 1956), vacated as moot, 354 U.S. 933 (1957) (repeal of South
Carolina law); Romero v. Wealdey, 131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Calif.), reo'd, 226 F.2d
399 (9th Cir., 1955) (no dispute as to the state law). Wilson v. Beebe, 99 F. Supp.
418 (D. Del. 1951) (applied the Pullman doctrine in a pre-Brown decision concern-
ing school segregation).
62. E.g., Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959); Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258
F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1958); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1956). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit cases, see Arm-
strong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963), following the Supreme Court
decision in McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), which pushed aside
the exhaustion requirement. For a discussion of cases prior to McNeese, see the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 819 (1962). Most of the
cases which do not require exhaustion turn on the inadequacy of the state procedures,
e.g., Jeffers v. Whitley, supra note 17.
63. 369 U.S. 350 (1962); accord, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962). See also
NAACP v. Gallion, 290 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 368 U.S. 16 (1961).
64. Supra note 29.
trip to the Supreme Court as NAACP v. Button.65 On its -way
back, the plaintiff had had all its claims adjudicated by the state
courts and petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Although the
district court had reserved jurisdiction of the case, the Supreme Court
held that this reservation did not impair the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion to review a final determination of the state court. The case was
in the courts for almost seven years before the statutes in question
were finally adjudged unconstitutional.
Other decisions from the Supreme Court have made inroads on the
doctrine. Monroe v. Pape,66 was a suit against state officials under
the Civil Rights Act.67 A negro family charged that Chicago police
officers invaded their home, subjected them to humiliation, arrested
the father of the family, then released him without taking him before
a magistrate, allowing him to call his family or attorney or charging
him. Although the state constitution and statutes provided a remedy
for this type of illegal action, the Court held that the plaintiffs were
not required to proceed under state law. "It is no answer that the
State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."68 The
Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas, discussed extensively the history
and purposes of the legislation, concluding that the acts, though con-
trary to state law, were "under color of state law" and therefore within
the prohibitions of section 1983.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, was of the opinion that section
1983 created a civil liability enforceable in the federal courts only
when redress for the injury was barred in the state courts because
some "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage" sanctioned the
action complained of.69 He further stated: "Permitting such actions
necessitates the immediate decision of federal constitutional issues
despite the admitted availability of state law remedies which would
avoid those issues. This would make inroads, throughout a large area,
upon the principal of federal judicial self-limitation which has be-
come a significant instrument in the efficient functioning of the
national judiciary,"70 citing Pullman.
65. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
66. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 15 VAD. L. REv. 267 (1961).
67. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress." REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
68. 365 U.S. at 183.
69. 365 U.S. 167, 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 240.
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At one time, one would have expected a significant decision on the
abstention doctrine in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Ed-
ward County.71 A district court judgment which, in effect, would
require the reopening of Prince Edward County's tax-supported pub-
lic schools on an integrated basis, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court of appeals indicated the
district court should abstain until the state courts had ruled on the
meaning and validity of the state laws involved, basically statutes
providing for tuition grants to students attending private schools, if
their county chose not to operate a school system. Before the Supreme
Court ruled on the case, however, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals ruled on the statutes involved, finding them valid.72 Thus,
the abstention problem became moot. Nonetheless, the Court's
opinion states that even lacking the decision by the state courts, it
was proper for the district court to proceed. The Court's opinion
notes the continued delaying tactics employed by the defendants
and the state government, and goes on to say "there has been entirely
too much deliberation and not enough speed" in enforcing the rights
of Prince Edward County's Negro children.7 3 The significance of this
pronouncement by the court cannot be fully determined as yet. The
statement occupies but a paragraph in a moderately long opinion;74 It
was not essential to the decision. But it probably indicates an increas-
ing hostility to employ the abstention doctrine in civil rights cases.
B. McNeese and the Exhaustion Requirement
McNeese v. Board of Education,7 5 while not an abstention case,
merits examination because it signals a relaxation of the exhaustion
requirement in civil liberties cases.
The Monroe case was a basis for the later decision in McNeese.
Again an action was brought under the Civil Rights Act 76 by Negro
plaintiffs alleging segregation within a public school. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs
had not exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the
Illinois School Code,77 saying, "it is generally accepted in the cases
71. 84 Sup. Ct. 1226 (1964).
72. County School Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963). "The
refusal of the highest court of this State to recognize here the rights of the citizens of
Prince Edward County, guaranteed to them under the Constitution of the United States,
is a clear invitation to the federal courts to step in and enforce such rights. I am
sure that that invitation will be promptly accepted. We shall seel" Id. at 584 (Eggles-
ton, C.J., dissenting).
73. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1232.
74. Ibid.
75. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
76. RPv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
77. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 22-19 (1962). According to the Court, "By that Code
50 residents of a school district or 10%, whichever is lesser, can file a complaint with
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that Federal Courts should not interfere with a State's opera-
tion and administration of its schools, nor with the performance of
administrative duties in the absence of necessity, until administrative
remedies have been exhausted."7 8 The Supreme Court reversed, citing
Monroe v. Pape and enumerating the purposes of section 1983, "to
override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where state
law was inadequate, 'to provide a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice'...
and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any
remedy the State might have."79 Although the administrative proce-
dure might not have been adequate since the Superintendent himself
had no power to order corrective action, but was to "request" the
Attorney General for relief,80 the Court determined that federal rights
need not be first examined in a state proceeding. The question may
be asked whether the Court was referring to all federal rights or only
those civil liberties for which there is protective congressional legis-
lation. Precisely how far McNeese goes in cutting back on the doc-
trine of abstention where there is adequate state administrative
procedure is a question which remains unanswered. It is a likely guess
that McNeese will not be used to make inroads on the requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies other than in the field of
civil rights.
V. PROCEDURE
As before noted, apart from the academics of the abstention doc-
trine, there is the question of its value in terms of fairness to litigants,
i.e., expense, confusion, and delay. The expense of piecemeal litigation
is obvious. The problem of procedural confusion has recently been
clarified, at least to some extent.8 ' The question of delay, which has
been referred to in one Supreme Court decision as a "relatively
minor inconvenience"82 is an inquiry which is perhaps most appro-
priately directed to the abstention doctrine in the area of civil rights,
where delay may prove to be defeat.
If the court has refused to exercise jurisdiction because the state
has provided administrative remedies, the state administrative pro-
the Superintendent of Public Instruction alleging that a pupil has been segregated in
a school on account of race. . . .After hearing the Superintendent notifies the parties
of his decision and, if he decides that the allegations in the complaint are "substantially
correct," requests the Attorney General to bring suit to rectify the practice." 373 U.S.
at 670.
78. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 305 F.2d 783, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1962), reo'd, 373
U.S. 668 (1963).
79. McNeese v. Board of Educ., supra note 75, at 672.
80. Supra note 77.
81. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
82. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., supra note 52, at 212.
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ceedings are not res judicata and may be adjudicated in the federal
forum.83 But what about the case where the federal court retains
jurisdiction while local law problems are being clarified by a state
court? The problem of res judicata then arises, for the plaintiff may
not know whether to litigate all his issues, both state and federal,
or only those state issues which are unclear. If all issues are litigated,
will his only recourse be to the Supreme Court? Until recently these
questions have plagued attorneys and courts in abstention cases. 4 In
Government and Civic Employees Organizing Comm'n v. Windsor,'
the plaintiff union sought to enjoin enforcement of a state statute
and a declaratory judgment that the union did not come within
the meaning of the statute, on the ground that as so applied, the statute
would violate the fourteenth amendment. In the case's first trip to
the Supreme Court,86 the federal district court was ordered to abstain
while the plaintiff went to the state court where the state issues were
litigated. Losing there, the union appealed to the state supreme
court, which held that the statute applied to the plaintiff union, with
no mention of the statute's alleged unconstitutionality. The federal
court then held the statute constitutional and dismissed. Appealed
once more to the Supreme Court, the case was reversed in order that
the state courts could hear plaintiff's constitutional objections, the
Supreme Court saying, "the bare adjudication by the Alabama Su-
preme Court that the union is subject to this act does not suffice,
since that court was not asked to interpret the statute in light of the
constitutional objections presented to the District Court." 7 After two
more trips to the lower courts, both state and federal, the plaintiff
gave up.
Windsor has been criticized by the opponents of abstention as an
example of the confusion and delay which the doctrine fosters.88 The
Court, however, did enunciate a rule of procedure. This rule of pro-
cedure was finally clarified this year by the Supreme Court in England
83. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
84. See Note, 73 HAnv. L. RBv. 1358, 1364-65 (1960); Note, 59 CoLum. L. REV.
749, 773 (1959).
85. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
86. 347 U.S. 901 (1954).
87. 353 U.S. at 366.
88. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 45, at 818; Note, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 749, 773
(1959); Note, 73 Hv. L. REv. 1358, 1364 (1960). A comparable case was in and
out of state and federal courts for over nine years, pursuing a circuitous route through
the federal system. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 47 F. Supp. 671 (D.
Conn. 1942); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943); Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 15 Conn. Supp. 205 (Super. Ct. Hartford County 1947);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (1948); Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950); Spector Motor Serv., Inc, v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1957).
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v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.89 Plaintiffs, grad-
uates of schools of chiropractice, sought to practice in Louisiana with-
out complying with the educational requirements of the Louisiana
Medical Practice Act.90 Bringing an action against the Board in the
federal district court, they sought an injunction and a declaration that
the statute, as applied to them, violated the fourteenth amendment.
The court abstained on the ground that it was not clear whether the
statute applied to chiropractors and stayed the action while the
plaintiffs proceeded in a state court. There the plaintiffs did not re-
strict the question to be determined to whether the statute applied to
them but, relying on the Windsor decision, argued all issues, includ-
ing the constitutional ones. The Louisiana court held that the statute
applied to chiropractors and did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. Returning to the federal court, the plaintiffs' action was dis-
missed on the ground that since the Louisiana Court had considered
all the issues and since the district court had no power of review,
the proper remedy was appeal to the Supreme Court.9 '
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of the federal issues, because the plaintiffs
and the lower court had misunderstood Windsor. Windsor, the
Court said, only required that the state court be informed of the
federal claims so that the state statute might be construed "in light
of" those claims. To avoid res judicata as to those claims, a party
need only inform the state court of his intention to return to the
federal court should the state issue be decided against him. In any
event, a party may not be precluded from litigating his claims in a
federal court "unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily did more
than Windsor required and fully litigated his federal claims in the
state courts. 9
2
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, was of the opinion
that the Pullman doctrine needed reappraisal; and if Pullman were
to be preserved, the party forced to go to the state court should not
be considered to have given up his federal suit, unless he so elects.
In other words, Justice Douglas thought the "presumption should
work the other way,"93 just in case attorneys and litigants should
overlook this "exotic" rule of procedure and neglect to reserve the
right of recourse to a federal district court. The delay in the case
(the complaint having been filed seven years before), he thought,
was "an unnecessary price to pay for our federalism."94 Furthermore,
89. Supra note 81.
90. 37 LA. REv. STAT. §§ 1261-1290 (1950).
91. 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961).
92. 375 U.S. at 421.
93. Id. at 429 (Douglas, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 426 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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this kind of delay would prove especially serious in the field of civil
rights, where the road to a determination of federal questions would
prove long and expensive.
Delay which the Pullman doctrine sponsors, keeps the status quo en-
trenched and renders 'a defendant's judgment' even in the face of constitu-
tional requirements. These evils are all compounded by what we do today,
making it likely that litigants seeking the protection of the federal courts for
assertion of their civil rights will be ground down slowly by the passage of
time and the expenditure of money in state proceedings, leaving the ultimate
remedy here, at least in many cases, an illusory one.95
VI. CONCLUSION
While the abstention doctrine has as its function the utilization of a
sound policy of our federalism, the hazy lines of its applications and
limitations, as drawn by the Supreme Court, have deprived it of much
of its usefulness. Indeed in some cases, it is demonstrably a liability
in the quest for justice and expedience. If applied as a rigid jurisdic-
tional rule, requiring reversal and either a stay or dismissal after the
case has been decided in the federal court on its merits, it is a wasteful
and unnecesssary course, justified possibly by the policy behind it,
but not at all by the lack of guidance given by the Supreme Court or
Congress. As seen in many of the opinions handed down by a divided
Court, the doctrine presents puzzling problems, both because of
questions as to its constitutionality and the hazards of procedure.
The argument that abstention is in disregard of Congress' jurisdic-
tional mandate is met by those cases of the Pullman variety, where
the court retains jurisdiction. However, it cannot be questioned that
the federal court does surrender jurisdiction as to state law determi-
nation. This argument may be further met by the discretionary role
inherent in the function of the chancellor in equity proceedings. But
as one Supreme Court decision has pointed out, the policy of absten-
tion does not depend upon the unnecessary distinction between law
and equity.96 The real answer to the argument of abnegation of
original jurisdiction is a provision in the Judicial Code which would
clarify the application of the doctrine, set out the exceptions and
limitations, and satisfy the need for Congressional authorization.,
The argument that the Judicial Code has already outlined the
areas in which state remedies are to be exhausted, e.g., utility rate
orders and collection of state taxes,98 and that in any other area the
federal court must assume jurisdiction is met by the counter applica-
95. Id. at 436 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
97. See Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489
(1959).
98. Notes 5-7 supra.
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tion of the policy behind the enactment of the statute-the policy of
noninterference in state matters. Again, the real answer lies in
further provisions in the Judicial Code. The judge-made requirement
that a plaintiff be required to exhaust his state administrative remedies
might also be incorporated into the Code, for it is a sound rule and
despite McNeese, will surely be retained.
If the answer to these constitutional arguments does lie in further
provisions in the Judicial Code, the answer is only as sound as a
realistic evaluation of what the Code should say. As previously
pointed out, abstention cases run the gamut of factual situations.
Furthermore, it is impossible to predict in what future areas the doc-
trine may appear. Professor Wright has suggested that a solution
to the problem of drawing clear jurisdictional limits "may lie in a
meaningful grant of discretion to the trial judges, leaving their deci-
sion either to hear a case, or to stay it pending a state court decision,
or to dismiss it altogether in favor of the states, virtually unreview-
able,"99 although technically reviewable either by appeal in the case
of dismissal or mandamus if stayed, and appeal upon final judgment
in case of refusal to stay or to dismiss. "Setting the boundaries of this
discretion"100 is the task-from the positive approach to the line of
Pullman cases to the negative one in cases of dismissal because of
inconvenience.' 0 ' Abstention must be made to serve the purposes of
federalism.
99. Wright, supra note 45, at 825. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MiNN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
100. Wright, supra note 88, at 825.
101. Generally, an action pending in a state court is no ground for federal court
refusal to hear the case. Both actions go forward concurrently until one may be asserted
as res judicata in the other. The Second Circuit, however, has gone beyond the doctrine
of abstention as utilized by the Supreme Court. In Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1949), the court stayed a shareholder's action pending proceedings in a
state court in which nine similar actions were consolidated. In upholding the stay, the
court relied upon Supreme Court cases authorizing a plea of forum non conveniens, a
doctrine which usually means dismissal in favor of another federal court. In P. Briers-
dorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951), the district judge had ordered a
stay of a trademark infringement action pending determination of a state court declara-
tory judgment action which raised the same issues. Kurland, supra note 97, at 490-91,
who has approved these cases in the name of judicial economy, has pointed out that
the second court in time, whether state or federal, should stay proceedings in order
to avoid unnecessary duplication of result. This seems a practical answer to the prob-
lem of state court-federal court competition in the rush to res judicata, but it neglects
the constitutional command and also the oftentimes superior procedural and discovery
provisions accessible in the federal courts. The lower courts which have rejected the
discretionary power to stay a case which is pending in a state court have relied upon
a 1910 decision of the Supreme Court. "The rule is well-recognized that the pendency
of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in
the Federal court having jurisdiction." McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282
(1910). The case, however, may be distinguished on its facts, and as yet there seems
to be no Supreme Court decision precisely applicable. These stay-for-convenience cases
are not abstention-policy cases and go beyond any of the Supreme Court decisions
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The Meredith rule is a wise one and should be preserved. Although
federal courts no longer make state law in diversity cases, they must
remain free to resolve uncertain state law, if there are no "exceptional
circumstances" which demand otherwise. The jurisdiction of federal
courts would indeed be "diluted" if this were not so.' 02 The difficulty
of interpreting state law, says Professor Wright, should be a factor to
be weighed, along with other factors such as interfering with a state's
administration of its own affairs, in the exercise of discretion by the
trial judge. 03 Professor Moore also takes the position that diversity
jurisdiction must remain intact, but that "there is a need for common
sense accommodation .... [I]n exceptional circumstances it is more
important that the state law be correctly applied and hence the
diversity action should be stayed or dismissed, as the circumstances
warrant, until the unsettled local issues are adjudicated by the state
CoUrts."104
In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,10 5 a recent case which makes
clear that abstention is proper in legal actions between private parties,
the Supreme Court ordered the court of appeals to certify the question
of state law to the Florida Supreme Court-a procedure provided for
by a Florida statute. While this procedure has been praised by
writers'0 6 and by the Court in that opinion as an answer to the prob-
lems of delay and as an example of "cooperative federalism," Pro-
fessor Wright has pointed out that advisory opinions, "necessarily
abstract and divorced from a concrete factual setting" may prove
unsatisfactory, especially if their use would lead to abrogation of the
Meredith doctrine.17 Mr. Justice Douglas, while approving the cer-
and possibly beyond Supreme Court sanction. See generally, Note, 60 COLUM. L. REv.
684 (1960); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 978 (1950).
102. Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 35.
103. Wright, supra note 45, at 827. Compare Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner,
303 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1962), where the court said, "whether in a particular instance
a federal court should stay its hand pending state court action seems to us a highly
individual question in which all factors should be considered, the possibly [sic] delay,
the relative difficulty of estimating what the state court would decide, the importance
to the case of a state court determination, the relative burden on the parties of a
possibly long case in the federal court as against a short one in the state court, and
perhaps other matters." 303 F.2d at 128-29.
104. la MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2120 (1961).
105. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
106. See, e.g., Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to
the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MLisu
L. R-Ev. 413 (1962); Kurland, supra note 97; Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1963)
(suggesting that inter-jurisdictional certification might be extended to the conflict of laws
area with state courts certifying questions of the foreign law to the foreign state court).
However, for a discussion criticizing the certification process see Comment, Inter-
Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the Abstention Problem, 21 LA. L. REv. 777
(1961).
107. Wright, supra note 45.
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tification procedure, has stated that the Court "cannot require the
states to provide such a procedure; but by asserting the independence
of the federal courts and insisting on prompt adjudications we will
encourage its use."108 Possibly only the use of such a procedure over
a period of time will prove its effectiveness.
Abstention has been demonstrated to be a misplaced doctrine in
the field of civil rights, both because of the nature of the rights
asserted, the federal legislation on the subject, the essentially federal
nature of the problem, and because of the need for prompt adjudi-
cation. And while the trend is unmistakable in the federal judiciary,
as to this area, Congress should make clear the exception to the ab-
stention policy; "its measure is the rights of action given by the Civil
Rights Laws."109
JoycE Burrr
108. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra note 81, at 434
(Douglas, J., concurring).
109. Wechsler, supra note 56, at 230. See also the right to vote statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(d), which provides: "The district courts of the United States shall have juris-
diction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and shall exercise the same
without regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have exhausted any administrative
or other remedies that may be provided by law." REzv. STAT. § 2004 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(d) (1958).
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